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ORGANIZATIONAL ADAPTATION IN OFFSHORING: THE RELATIVE PERFORMANCE 
OF HOME- AND HOST-BASED LEARNING STRATEGIES 
  
Abstract: Offshoring offers managers the promise of substantial economic benefits, but also comes with 
the risk of increased complexity and coordination challenges. We argue that offshoring firms must 
accumulate architectural knowledge in order to keep the cost of complexity and coordination of the 
geographically separated activities at bay. Based on a simulation model that examines the performance 
implications of firms’ learning strategies when offshoring, we show that such knowledge accumulation 
can be achieved through either a home-based or a host-based learning strategy. Our analysis suggests that 
the relative performance of these two strategies depends on non-trivial interactions among the costs of 
communication, the distance to the offshoring location, and the level of noise in the firm’s performance 
function. In particular, the difficulties of interpreting performance signals in noisy situations suggest that 
there are benefits of making changes to the configuration after the offshoring implementation (host based 
learning). In contrast, when coordination costs and distance dominate, the strategy of gearing the 
organization for offshoring prior to separating them across country borders prevails (home-based 
learning). Thus, by formalizing these two learning strategies for acquiring architectural knowledge in 
offshoring, we show that important contingencies can lead to significant performance trade-offs in the 
search for new organizational configurations that span international borders. 
 






As much as the benefits of offshoring have attracted a large number of multinational firms to relocate 
business activities to distant locations, the strategy has also introduced managers to difficult dilemmas. In 
particular, it has been noted that firms’ value chains are subject not only to centrifugal forces encouraging 
geographic dispersion, but also to centripetal forces that encourage co-location of related activities 
(Baldwin and Venables 2013). Accordingly, many firms struggle to reap the economic returns from 
offshoring without getting overwhelmed by the complexity of coordinating dispersed activities across 
vast distances (Contractor et al. 2010, Larsen, Manning and Pedersen 2013, Srikanth and Puranam 2011). 
To shed light on this issue, we explore the performance implications of organizational adaptation when 
offshoring.  
The extensive research on organizational adaptation has demonstrated that changing technologies 
and environments force boundedly rational problem solvers to engage in an adaptive search for 
satisfactory solutions to complex problems (Cyert and March 1963, Gavetti 2005, Levinthal 1997, 
Levinthal and March 1981, March and Simon 1958, Nelson and Winter 1982, see also Online Appendix 1 
for an overview). However, as recent research shows, the ways in which firms actually engage in such 
processes is unclear (Baumann and Siggelkow 2014, Fleming 2001, Winter et al. 2007). In particular, the 
answer to the question of when firms should initiate adaptive search processes when they are faced with 
uncertainty regarding integration of separated (but interdependent) activities and the added coordination 
requirements across distance is not straightforward. Given that the literature streams on offshoring and 
adaptation remain largely disjointed, extant research provides little guidance on this question. 
In an attempt to bridge these two literature streams and provide a more complete picture of how 
firms adapt their organizations in an international context, we build a simulation model that allows us to 
analyze the performance implications of different learning strategies in relation to offshoring. We embed 
our argument in the observation that the structure of firms’ search processes has important performance 
effects (Bauman and Siggelkow 2014), and focus on how firms accumulate architectural knowledge in 
order to accommodate for the added coordination requirements associated with offshoring. Hence, we 
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emphasize that firms reconstructing their organizations in a new international setting must gain 
architectural knowledge regarding the interfaces within a system of complex, causally ambiguous, and 
imperfectly understood tasks, processes, and organizational routines. 
We investigate the performance implications of two generic learning strategies that firms may 
employ in their approach to offshoring. First, firms can pursue a host-based learning strategy, in which 
they initiate the accumulation of architectural knowledge only after a relocation has taken place. Thus, 
firms pursuing this strategy adapt their configurations to the technological landscape on the basis of their 
actual offshoring experience. Second, firms can follow a home-based learning strategy through which 
they initiate the accumulation of architectural knowledge prior to the actual offshoring of activities. In 
these cases, firms accumulate architectural knowledge by experimenting with different configurations 
while the activities are still located in the home country. When these firms begin to offshore, they can 
utilize this knowledge for effective adaptation in the new location. 
Received wisdom on the importance of “being prepared” would seem to favor the home-based 
approach. By engaging in deliberate planning and due diligence prior to offshoring (see Ansoff et al. 
1970, Puranam et al. 2006), firms can gear their organizations to handle the coordinative challenges of 
offshoring. However, in our simulation, this intuition is not necessarily supported. On the one hand, we 
find that a home-based learning strategy is often associated with higher performance than a host-based 
learning strategy when distances and communication costs are high. As the costs of coordinating an 
international organization across geographical distances rise, firms can benefit from accumulating 
architectural knowledge prior to an international reconfiguration. As such, the benefits of “being 
prepared” outweigh the costs of such up-front investments. On the other hand, as the noise in the search 
function increases, we find that the host-based learning strategy becomes associated with higher 
performance than the home-based learning strategy. Noise—resulting from the uncertainty of the 
technologies being relocated—makes it difficult for firms to estimate the impact and consequences of an 
organizational reconfiguration prior to its implementation. In such situations, firms may invest in 
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accumulating architectural knowledge before the offshoring event, only to find that the acquired 
knowledge does not reflect the actual coordination challenges in the globally dispersed organization.  
With this article, we contribute to the extant literature by applying the concept of organizational 
adaptation in the context of offshoring. In addition to building on extant, formal models of adaptation by 
acknowledging the roles of distance, noise, and opposing learning strategies, we extend the research on 
offshoring and the global distribution of work by stressing the importance of coordination costs and the 
need to accumulate architectural knowledge. While extant research on internationalization has often 
focused on the degree to which firms must adapt their strategies to serve local requirements (Lord and 
Ranft 2000, Makino and Delios 1996, Siegel and Larson 2009), we suggest that firms face a paradox 
when deciding to reconfigure internationally. More specifically, we argue that deliberate planning and 
due diligence (Ansoff et al. 1970, Puranam et al. 2006) through home-based learning may lead to 
performance-deteriorating trajectories. In this regard, our results echo those presented by Szulanski and 
Jensen (2006, 2008), who studied the performance effects of a replication strategy (“copying exactly”) 
versus a local adaptation strategy when internationalizing. A key point of their research is the necessity of 
acknowledging the distinction between the adaptation of spatial dimensions (related to the accumulation 
of local market knowledge) and the adaptation of organizational dimensions (similar to accumulating 
architectural knowledge). However, while they focus on the immediate trade-off between pursuing 
architectural knowledge (replication) and local market knowledge (local adaptation), we focus on the 
issue of adaptation in offshoring given the complexities of disaggregating an interdependent organization, 
and relocating tasks and sub-components to foreign locations. Thus, in the context of noise, the 
difficulties of interpreting performance signals suggests that there are benefits of making changes in the 
configuration in the host location. In contrast, in the context of coordination costs and distance, it makes 
sense to gear the organization for offshoring prior to separating them across country borders.  
In the following, and before introducing our theoretical background and the model itself, we 
discuss the dilemma inherent in offshoring adaptation through an illustrative case study of product 
development in Nokia Denmark (a Danish R&D subsidiary of the Nokia Corporation). 
5 
 
Adaptation in offshoring: The case of product development in Nokia Denmark1  
The primary activity of Nokia Denmark in the early 2000s was the development of new mobile-phone 
models, including every aspect of mechanics, electro-mechanics, electronics, and software. Nokia 
Denmark possessed all of the competencies needed to move a new mobile phone from the initial 
specification to final production. The development process included designing the specifications of a new 
mobile phone, working with suppliers, and preparing the phone for production, after which the entire 
project was transferred to a production site for mass-market production.  
***Figure 1 about here*** 
Nokia Denmark had conducted many development projects over the years, and it followed the 
standardized process as shown in Figure 1. The various activities were organized according to five 
milestones that could only be reached if an assigned committee approved the development. PD0 marks 
the initiation of the product program; PD1 notes the product- development release (i.e., full functionality 
of the product); PD2 indicates the manufacturing release (i.e., full performance of the product); PD3 notes 
the delivery release (i.e., ready for the market); and PD4 represents the determination of product 
development (i.e., handover to product maintenance). Each of these cycles typically took around one year. 
One Nokia product development manager explained the process as follows: 
Concept mapping focuses on creating a lot of different ideas and finding the ones with most 
promise. Product development is basically maturing what we have at that point—a concept. 
Product maintenance aims at keeping the product alive and integrating different components. We 
have divided the process into these parts, as each phase requires different competences and 
mindsets. 
 
Offshoring to China 
 
1 This illustrative case draws on primary data collected by the authors through a number of semi-structured 
interviews conducted with Nokia Denmark managers in 2009 and 2010 (see also Larsen and Pedersen, 2011). It 
should, of course, be noted that the generalizability of this case may be limited, especially when considering the 
broader context of the events described in this case: In 2012, the activities in Denmark were shut down and moved 
to other Nokia R&D sites, and in 2013, Microsoft announced that it would acquire Nokia’s entire mobile phone 
business. Furthermore, Foxconn has a notorious reputation of poor working conditions and high suicide rates among 
its employees. Thus, we acknowledge that the illustrative example used here potentially bears on multiple complex 
issues, but retain that it also provides interesting insights that motivate the relevance of our model and simulation.  
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On average, Nokia Denmark conducted around eight mobile-phone development projects running in 
parallel. However, in 2007, the management of Nokia Denmark decided to begin offshoring parts of the 
process to China, where they were to be handled by Foxconn, a major multinational electronics 
component manufacturer. Nokia Denmark decided to offshore two of the parallel development projects, 
while retaining around six projects in Denmark. The move was motivated by a desire for cost savings and 
by the fact that Foxconn had supplied electronics components to Nokia for a number of years. As such, 
the two companies already had a relatively high degree of integration.  
The intention of the collaboration was that the Danish organization would be responsible for 
development of the advanced parts of new mobile phones, while the Chinese organization would focus on 
more standardized parts, such as the molding and fitting of plastic components. Specifically, the 
responsibility for the product-development phase (PD0-PD4) was relocated to China, while product-
portfolio management and product maintenance were still handled in Denmark. Consequently, the entire 
development function was reconfigured from being exclusively located in Denmark to become dispersed, 
with interdependent tasks split between Denmark and China.  
Adaptation challenges  
Nokia’s Danish management team had little experience in offshoring knowledge-intensive and 
technologically sophisticated activities across such vast distances. Therefore, it had little architectural 
knowledge on how the offshored activities could best be re-integrated into the product-development 
process. The company had hoped that the foreign activities would be largely self-manageable and require 
minimum intervention. However, the management quickly learned that the critical interfaces between 
concept mapping and product maintenance in Denmark on the one hand, and product development in 
China on the other, presented substantial coordination challenges. In particular, safeguarding against 
misinterpretations and misbehavior required substantially more coordination than initially expected. 
According to a Nokia manager: 
We started out with mechanics and plastic parts in China because the Chinese had the 
competencies and could, therefore, govern themselves. However, we quickly came to the 
conclusion that this did not really work. It required too much management overhead and it did 
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not really free up any resources. We were still sitting here reviewing the drawings to see if they 
had done them properly and checking that the test results were good enough. 
  
Therefore, although the architecture may have been effective while all of the activities were 
located in Denmark, the decision to relocate certain activities to China gave rise to new coordination 
challenges for management. For example, while the crucial interdependencies could originally be 
coordinated through relatively informal mechanisms, such as face-to-face meetings, the offshoring move 
required new architectural knowledge and the introduction of alternative mechanisms that could 
accompany the new configuration.  
Consequently, the Danish management began to experiment with different architectural solutions, 
such as disaggregating the value chain in different ways, standardizing the interdependencies, and 
implementing new coordination mechanisms. For example, Nokia Denmark’s management learned that 
frequent meetings and task monitoring were vital for ensuring that the products were developed as 
expected. They also realized that it was necessary to transfer substantially more information to China on 
the interfaces inherent in the mobile phones. Consequently, the Danish management decided to assign 
eight full-time Nokia Denmark employees to follow and monitor the offshored projects, which were 
handled by 30 to 50 engineers in China. The Nokia employees arranged weekly video conferences to 
discuss the status of each project, as well as specific technological and organizational challenges or 
alterations that might have arisen. Moreover, the partners met in either Denmark or China every six to 
eight weeks. In addition, Nokia began altering the configuration by assigning more technical 
responsibilities to China. Nokia Denmark soon learned that the original intention of handling the 
mechanical and plastic parts in China, and technical optimization in Denmark was far too costly in terms 
of coordinating the interfaces between the activities. Therefore, management decided to transfer parts of 
these activities to China.  
 In terms of the terminology introduced earlier in this article, Nokia Denmark’s approach to the 
offshoring process can be categorized as an example of host-based learning. Along these lines, one Nokia 
manager commented:  
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It is really learning-by-doing. Nokia is kind of a “cowboy” company. We plunge into things, 
muddle our way through and eventually become wiser. There is not much design in the things we 
do. We go out and try, and then we adjust. 
 
Nokia Denmark was well experienced in conducting development projects domestically. 
However, it embarked on the offshoring process rather abruptly without acknowledging the likely 
challenges of international coordination. In this respect, it is interesting to know whether Nokia Denmark 
would have been better off if it had diligently attempted to map out the coordinative challenges of 
offshoring prior to the implementation (i.e., a home-based strategy). Thus, this illustrative case gives rise 
to our central questions: How do firms adapt to technological landscapes in an international context? 
What are the performance implications of different adaption approaches?  
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Firms engage in offshoring for a number of reasons, including a desire to access low-cost labor, talent, 
and markets (Manning et al. 2008). For example, Nokia Denmark’s decision to offshore product 
development was largely driven by cost considerations. Evidently, the pursuit of offshoring strategies has 
been a prolific adventure for many firms (e.g., Dossani and Kenney 2003). However, research also finds 
evidence of hidden or unexpected offshoring costs and challenges that make the practice less beneficial 
(Dibbern et al. 2008, Larsen et al. 2013, Stringfellow et al. 2008). The geographical relocation of 
activities can generate major organizational changes that may not only undermine previously coherent 
flows of knowledge and communication, but also force additional investments into costly coordination 
efforts (e.g., Jensen et al. 2013, Srikanth and Puranam 2011). When activities are co-located, firms may 
rely on informal coordination mechanisms as daily challenges can be solved in a face-to-face manner 
(Allen 1977, Storper and Venables 2004). However, as activities become geographically dispersed, the 
opportunities for building collegial social environments and common ground due to less communication 
and shared context are undermined (Srikanth and Puranam 2011). For example, after offshoring parts of 
its activities, Nokia was forced to experiment with new configurations that could accommodate the 
unexpected coordination challenges between Denmark and China.  
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Accordingly, to address the magnified coordination costs of offshoring, we stress that firms must 
engage in local adaptive search to understand the technological landscapes underlying their international 
organizations (see, for example, Ethiraj and Levinthal 2004a, Rivkin and Siggelkow 2003). A 
technological landscape describes the structure and interdependencies of firms’ underlying micro-
activities—such as component design, product production, product assembly, and marketing—and 
represents the “true underlying structure of the system of interdependent choices” (Ethiraj and Levinthal 
2004b, p. 162). Thus, the purpose of adaptation is to reconfigure elements in firms’ organization to match 
the underlying technological landscape. The closer the match between the organizational configuration 
and the technological landscape, the better the firms’ utilization of its resources and, thus, its performance 
(Levinthal 1997). 
In this respect, successful adaptation requires knowledge about the individual organizational 
activities that constitute the technological landscape and how those activities can best be integrated into 
an organizational system. In the literature, this “architectural knowledge” (Baldwin and Clark 2000, 
Brusoni and Prencipe 2006, Ethiraj and Levinthal 2004a, Henderson and Clark 1990) is defined as an 
“understanding of how components in an organizational system are related to each other” (Puranam et al. 
2012, p. 420). Henderson and Clark (1990), for example, refer to architectural knowledge as consisting of 
knowledge about the different components underlying a distinct system (i.e., product technology) and 
knowledge about how those components are integrated into an orchestrated systemic whole.  
To understand the performance implications of acquiring architectural knowledge in offshoring 
we explore two distinct learning strategies: a host-based learning strategy and a home-based learning 
strategy. First, a firm can commence the adaptation process after the activities have physically been 
offshored, as in Nokia Denmark’s case. In such cases, the firm commences an adaptive search for 
organizational configurations based on the technological landscape, but it does not do so until it 
encounters the actual costs of offshoring. This strategy allows the firm to avoid up-front investments in 
accumulating architectural knowledge during the onsite transition phase, as it only accumulates 
architectural knowledge through experiential learning. As firms encounter the actual challenges of 
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offshoring, they become better able to understand how to adapt to those challenges and, thereby, enhance 
performance. Along these lines, studies by Szulanski and Jensen (2006, 2008) on the international 
expansion of franchise projects in which exact copies of the existing template turn out, at least initially, to 
be the best performing strategy indicate that adaptation before internationalization is less beneficial. 
Therefore, this approach is supportive of research that views offshoring as a learning-by-doing process 
(e.g., Jensen 2009, Manning et al. 2008, Maskell et al. 2007) and, more broadly, the view of emergent 
strategies (Mintzberg and Waters 1985). We refer to this strategy as a host-based learning strategy. 
Second, a firm can accumulate architectural knowledge prior to the actual offshoring by 
employing different measures to improve its understanding of how it can best adapt to the technological 
landscape appearing after offshoring. In other words, firms can use the disposable time before the 
physical relocation, while the activities are still co-located, to experiment with different adaptation 
possibilities. This may involve experimenting with the reconfiguration of activities in distinct but co-
located units in order to understand the roles and functions of the activities to be offshored, and how those 
activities are interconnected. This strategy of due diligence, or “strategic planning” (Ansoff et al. 1970, 
Puranam et al. 2006), is in accordance with the literature suggesting that firms with explicit, corporate-
wide strategies for offshoring generally experience better performance (e.g., Massini et al. 2010). 
Henceforth, we refer to this type of strategy as a home-based learning strategy. 
In comparing these learning strategies, we seek a better understanding of the performance 
implications of the firms’ adaptive efforts in offshoring. In this respect, we focus on three specific 
contingencies relevant to the offshoring context: the level of coordination costs, distance, and noise in the 
adaptive search processes. First, as firms must devise appropriate mechanisms of communication to 
ensure efficient coordination in an interdependent organization, we note that the costs of using different 
communication measures can vary considerably (Allen, 1977). Such mechanisms may range from 
informal, more cost-intensive people-based mechanisms to formal, more cost-effective information 
mechanisms. Thus, we account for the variance in the marginal costs of devising the necessary 
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communication and decisions among organizational members to complete work jointly or individually 
across or within organizational boundaries (e.g., Galbraith 1973, Thompson 1967, Zhou 2011).  
Second, as we saw in the Nokia case, a key consequence of offshoring is that the distance 
introduced has an impact on the coordination challenges stemming from offshoring (Kumar et al. 2009, 
Niederman et al. 2006, Srikanth and Puranam 2011). For example, when its activities were co-located in 
Denmark, Nokia could rely more on informal coordination to ensure joint action. However, after 
offshoring, Nokia was forced to invest in new coordination mechanisms based on travel, personnel 
rotation, and socialization—the costs of which are largely proportional to the physical distance between 
the units. Employees at geographically dispersed locations may have few opportunities to engage in 
informal, face-to-face coordination, and they may find themselves forced to rely on less effective 
technology-based coordination mechanisms (Allen 1977, Cummings and Kiesler 2007, Storper and 
Venables 2004). Project teams may find it more difficult to build collegial social environments and 
common ground (Clark and Brennan 1991, Kraut et al. 1990), and may instead opt for what Siegel and 
Larson (2009) term “flexible intermediate adaptation” to uphold and increase performance. Therefore, 
while prior models of adaptation have not explicitly addressed the impact of geography, we focus on 
explicitly on distance and its impact on the challenges of coordination. While we acknowledge the 
multidimensional nature of distance (e.g., Berry, Guillen, and Zhou 2010), our focus on the geographical 
dimension is motivated by fact that it is likely to be a particular problematic type of distance for 
offshoring firms, as it is directly associated with key sources of coordination costs including travel time 
and cost (Asmussen and Goerzen 2013). Moreover, geographical distance can be seen as a proxy for other 
types of distance, since offshoring to physically distant locations often brings with it a cultural and 
institutional element as well (as in the Nokia case above).  
 Finally, as offshoring eventually implies the relocation of technologies to foreign locations, we 
focus on the impact of technological uncertainty and the resulting noisy performance signals it produces 
(e.g., Fleming 2001, Knudsen and Levinthal 2007, Lant and Mezias 1990, Levinthal 1997, Lounamaa and 
March 1987). Specifically, the uncertainty associated with the relocated technologies—coming from 
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factors such as demand fluctuations (Storper 1996) and technological changes (Teece and Pisano 1994)—
creates noise that may impact the processes of adaptation in significant manner (e.g., Denrell and March 
2001, Nelson and Winter 1982, Sommer and Loch 2004). In the Nokia case, the rapid evolution of 
technologies in the mobile-phone industry meant that the performance-related signals arising from altered 
configurations were obscured by noisy performance signals. In contrast, a company operating in an 
industry characterized by stable supply and demand, and low technological uncertainty—an example 
could be the cement industry—would be less exposed to noise. Notably, noise can create errors in 
perceiving or interpreting experience (Lounamaa and March 1987, Lant and Mezias 1990, Miner and 
Mezias 1996). For example, in their simulation study of firm adaption, Denrell and March (2001, p. 533) 
argue that “noise generates errors in the feedback on which adaptation is based and produces failures 
(eliminations) and successes (survivals) that are arbitrary relative to the true potentials at the time.” 
Similarly, Lounamaa and March (1987, p. 118) emphasize that “since noise has a greater impact on 
performance than any single change in the control variables, the search for a good value for the 
coordination factor becomes a random, highly unstable, process with an outcome worse than any 
reasonable fixed level of coordination.” Following this logic, we henceforth use the term “noise” to refer 
to the degree of technological uncertainty inherent in the focal relocated technology. 
THE MODEL 
We develop a model that allows us to simulate and investigate firm adaptation in the context of offshoring 
(see Online Appendix 2 for associations to similar models). In the model, the firm faces a fixed, 
exogenous technological landscape and chooses its configuration of activities against this landscape, 
assigning and reassigning various activities to different organizational units. To illustrate, after the 
relocation of its product-development function to China, Nokia began to experiment with the 
geographical composition of engineers assigned to product-development projects with the purpose of 
managing the coordinative challenges. We assume that the company initially has no architectural 
knowledge as all activities previously have been co-located and coordinated informally, but that such 
knowledge is necessary once it embarks on offshoring. In order to introduce and execute our model, the 
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following characteristics are specified: a) the underlying technological landscape; b) a function 
introducing the key parameters of firm performance, including coordination costs, the compounding 
effect of distance, and the impact of noise; c) a description of the two different offshoring learning 
strategies firms may employ for adaptation; and d) the contingencies for the simulation, including the 
value-parameters and their relationship to the offshoring context.2 
The technological landscape 
A firm’s technological landscape includes information on whether its activities are interdependent and 
therefore need coordination. Without loss of generality, we assume 100 activities in our model. The 
structure of the interdependencies in the technological landscape is not completely random, as activities 
can often be grouped according to their natural interdependencies. For example, one can assume that the 
sub-activities within Nokia’s product-portfolio planning (e.g., road and concept mapping) and product 
development (e.g., product development, manufacturing, and delivery release) activities are more tightly 
coupled together than the two groups of activities are interlinked with each other (the interdependency 
represented by P0 in Figure 1). To capture this idea, we assume that the landscape consists of two larger 
“natural modules” in which activities 1-50 belong to Module A and activities 51-100 belong to Module B. 
This structure is initially unknown to the firm’s decision makers, but its performance impact can be 
exposed over time through experimental learning. We define the technological landscape’s degree of 
modularity (𝑥 ∈ [0,1]) as the extent to which the interdependencies between activities occur within, rather 
than across, Modules A and B. With no modularity , activities are not only interdependent on 
other activities within the same module but also (and equally strongly) on activities in the other module. 
Hence, there is no obvious way for the firm to group its activities into two units. With full modularity 
, each activity is only interdependent on other activities within the same module, and the modules 
are thus attractive candidates for such a grouping. We model the extent to which a pair of activities are 
 





interdependent on each other as a binominal outcome (0, 1), which is determined in our model by the 
probability , where  if activities i and j are in the same natural module (in 
other words, both are in A or both are in B) and 0 otherwise. Hence, the higher the x, the more modular is 
the landscape.3 The derived technological landscape with its predefined interaction structure remains 
constant over time in each individual run of the model. 
Modeling performance in the context of offshoring 
Managers make adaptation choices regarding the structure of activities with respect to each activity’s 
assignment to an organizational unit and, thus, its location (at home or abroad). Unlike the fixed 
technological landscape, adaptation efforts are endogenous to the decisions of managers. At any given 
time, there is no guarantee that the configuration of activities in the firm’s units reflects the grouping 
implied by the natural modules (although the firm’s coordination costs will be lower if it does). Therefore, 
the purpose of accumulating architectural knowledge is to understand the technological landscape in order 
to ensure efficient adaptation. We assume the firm is able to reassign and relocate any activity except for 
a subset consisting of activities 1 to E (with 0 < 𝐸 < 50), which are locked in unit 1 in the home country 
and cannot be offshored. Our assumption is that these E activities are locally embedded in the home 
country—e.g. key R&D activities that are closely linked to domestic universities, specialized skills 
present in the domestic labor force, or tasks central to the firm’s core competencies. Furthermore, we 
assume this is known by the firm’s managers who will therefore keep them in the home country.4 In 
contrast, the rest of the activities (activities 𝐸 + 1 to 100) can be considered ‘footloose’ in the sense that 
they can be placed freely either at home or abroad.  
 Based on the firm’s configuration of activities into the two units at a given point in time, we 
model performance at that time as the result of a constant revenue stream (denoted R), from which we 
 
3 This is shown by the fact that setting 𝑥 = 0 results in 𝑝!" = 1/2, which implies that the natural modules have no 
impact on the random structure of interdependencies, while setting 𝑥 = 1 results in 𝑝!" = 𝑀!", which makes the 
interdependencies fall predictably into the two natural modules.  
4 We thereby rule out the risk that the firm accidentally offshores its core competencies and the potential 
performance consequences of doing so.  
( )12 1ij ijp xM x= + - 1ijM =
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subtract the costs of production (P) and the costs of coordination (K), both of which are determined by the 
activity configuration. Finally, to capture noise, we add a normally distributed stochastic term  with a 
mean of 0 and different degrees of standard deviation . Performance is thus given by: 
 𝜋 = 𝑅 − 𝑃 − 𝐾 + 𝜀 [1] 
 Production costs are defined as 𝑃 = 𝐴!𝑃! + 𝐴"𝑃" where  is the number of activities currently 
performed at the home location and  at the foreign location, 𝑃! is the production cost of one activity at 
home, and 𝑃" the production cost abroad. We assume that the activities can be conducted at a lower cost 
abroad (𝑃" < 𝑃!) as this is a key reason to offshore in the first place. To model coordination costs, we 
assume that a marginal coordination cost (k) is incurred for every activity pair that is linked by 
interdependencies. We assume that the cost of coordinating two activities between two units is higher 
than the cost of coordination within the same organizational unit, even if these two units are located in the 
same country. As seen with Nokia Denmark prior to offshoring, as activities within each unit may share 
common inputs, and as each unit may develop its own tacit knowledge, informal communication styles, 
formal communication channels, and value systems, coordination within a unit is easier than coordination 
between units. Thus, the coordination of intra-unit activities can be based on common ground and 
knowledge to a greater extent than the coordination of inter-unit activities, which relies more on costly 
ongoing communication (Srikanth and Puranam 2011). Formally, this can be expressed as 𝑘#$ < 𝑘#%, 
where L refers to local coordination, and W and B refer to within a unit and between units, respectively. 
For simplicity but without loss of generality, we set 𝑘#$ = 0 in the model, but assume that 𝑘#% > 0.  
We model the compounding effect of distance on coordination by assuming that 𝑘#% < 𝑘&%, 
where I represents the marginal coordination costs associated with international activities, so that there is 
a hierarchy of coordination costs: 𝑘#$ = 0 < 𝑘#% < 𝑘&%. We set 𝑘&% = (1 + 𝐷)𝑘#% and let 𝐷 > 0 







geographic distance between the home base and the offshoring location and its impact on coordination 
costs, and the higher the distance, the higher a coordination cost penalty is incurred by the firm 
Given these assumptions, the total cost of coordination is determined by the number of local 
inter-unit (𝑁#%) and international inter-unit (𝑁&%) interdependencies, where the number of activity pairs 
with interdependencies (N) is multiplied by the marginal costs of coordination (k) for each type of 
interdependency. Formally, this can be written as: 
 . [2] 
Finally, our modelling of noise (with the term e in Equation 1) is similar to prior research that 
seeks to understand the impact of noise or unforeseeable uncertainties on adaptive search behavior (e.g., 
Denrell and March 2001, Levinthal 1997, Nelson and Winter 1982, Sommer and Loch 2004). For 
example, in his original model, Levinthal (1997, p. 946) explores the implications of “noisy search” by 
including an error term in the performance function. Similarly, Denrell and March (2001) subject firms’ 
learning trials and competitive-selection processes to random errors in order to better capture the 
precision of adaptation. Therefore, by including a stochastic term in the performance equation, we assume 
that firms face noise that is conceptually different from the uncertainty of not possessing the architectural 
knowledge required for successful adaptation (but related as it makes it more difficult to obtain such 
knowledge).  
The combination of the above assumptions about the technological landscape and the 
performance of the firm enables us to rigorously capture a core dilemma of offshoring—the trade-off 
between production and coordination costs—and makes it clear why architectural knowledge is such a 
valuable asset in the firm’s efforts to solve this dilemma. To see this, note first that the firm incurs 0 
international coordination costs, but substantial production costs (100𝑃!) it does not offshore. In contrast, 
if it offshores all of its (100-E) ‘footlose’ activities, it incurs much lower production costs (𝐸𝑃! − (100 −
( )( )1LW LW LB LB IB IB LB IB LBK N k N k N k N N D k= + + = + +
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𝐸)𝑃") but also higher international coordination costs (!"𝐸(100 − 𝐸 − 𝑥𝐸)𝑘#%(1 + 𝐷)).
5 However, if the 
firm has acquired knowledge about its technological landscape, it would be able to place its activities 
according to their modular linkages, so that one unit coincides with natural module A (activities 1-50) and 
another one with natural module B (51-100). The latter unit can then be offshored, resulting in 
intermediate levels of both coordination costs (1,250(1 − 𝑥)𝑘#%(1 + 𝐷)) and production costs (50(𝑃! +
𝑃")). This results in superior overall performance when there is a balance between centrifugal forces (in 
our model, the cost savings of 𝑃! − 𝑃") and centripetal forces (the international coordination costs of  
𝑘#%(1 + 𝐷)), as captured by: 
 	2/(𝑥(50 + 𝐸) + 𝐸 − 50) < (𝑘#%(1 + 𝐷))/(𝑃! − 𝑃") < 1/(25(1 − 𝑥))			 [3] 
Intuitively, Inequality [3] implies that the ratio of international coordination costs to production 
cost savings is within an intermediate range, reflecting the rivalling importance of both of these factors to 
offshoring firms, as earlier emphasized and demonstrated by empirical studies (Ferreira and Prokopets 
2009; Larsen et al., 2013). Modular offshoring then provides an attractive way to strike a balance between 
these opposing forces—but can be achieved only if the firm possesses sufficient architectural knowledge 
to identify the technological interdependencies between its activities. This reinforces the importance of 
understanding how firms explore and adapt to the structure of the technological landscape, and thus how 
they obtain architectural knowledge to begin with, a process that is the focus of our simulation. 
Two learning strategies for accumulating architectural knowledge 
We model the knowledge acquisition process as taking place over H discrete time periods (rounds) 
denoted 𝑡 ∈ [1, 𝐻], with the offshoring event itself occurring at an intermediate time period 𝑡 = 𝑇, with 
1 < 𝑇 < 𝐻.  The firm’s performance in a given round, as described by Equations [1] and [2], constitutes 
the objective function that the decision maker continuously aims to improve by incrementally adapting 
the configuration of the firm’s activities and, thereby, accumulating learning about the technological 
 
5 The derivation of these cost functions and the proofs of all analytical results in this paper can be found in the 
Online Appendix 3. 
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landscape. On the basis of the two strategies portrayed earlier, we construct two learning scenarios: one in 
which the firm commences its search for a configuration already before the offshoring event at time T (the 
home-based learning strategy) and one in which the firm only begins its search after offshoring (the host-
based learning strategy). Hence, in the home-based scenario, the firm uses rounds 𝑡 ∈ [1, 𝑇 − 1] prior to 
offshoring to learn about the technological landscape, and continues this learning process in the time 
period after offshoring, 𝑡 ∈ [𝑇 + 1,𝐻], building on the architectural knowledge obtained in the first 
period. In the host-based scenario, the firm acquires no knowledge prior to offshoring, but begins to 
pursue a learning-by-doing approach in the time period after offshoring, 𝑡 ∈ [𝑇 + 1,𝐻]. 
Initial activity split and subsequent learning algorithm. At the outset of the simulation, all of the 
firm’s activities are included in one organizational unit located in the home country, implying that no 
coordination costs are incurred. However, the firm splits its activities into two equally large units either in 
preparation for the offshoring event at time 1 (in the home-based learning strategy) or as part of the 
offshoring event at time T (in the host-based strategy). It makes subsequent modifications to this initial 
activity split in an attempt to improve upon it. In terms of notation, we define unit 1 as the unit that 
resides (or will reside after offshoring) in the home country, and unit 2 as the unit that is placed in or 
moved to the foreign country.6   
Both the initial activity split and the subsequent modifications to that split are subject to the 
aforementioned constraint that activities 1 to 𝐸 are fixed in unit 1. Other than this constraint, we assume 
that the initial activity split is completely random, reflecting the firm’s lack of architectural knowledge. 
Hence, for each activity 𝐸 + 1 to 100, we draw a lottery with a probability (50 − 𝐸)/(100 − 𝐸) that the 
selected activity will be placed in unit 1. This results in an expected unit size of 50 for the two units (with 
 
6 A related decision is whether the foreign unit remains a wholly owned part of the parent firm, becomes a joint 
venture with a local partner, or is made part of an outsourcing agreement with a foreign supplier (as in the Nokia 
Denmark example) (Mudambi and Venzin 2009). While this decision has implications for core competencies, 
knowledge appropriation, and other important issues, it is beyond the scope of this study. The performance elements 
we model—coordination costs, production cost, and noise—are just as relevant when the two units are separated by 
organizational boundaries as when they are contained in the same firm. 
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unit 1, for example, consisting of activities 1 to E and an average of (100 − 𝐸)(50 − 𝐸)/(100 − 𝐸) =
50 − 𝐸 of the remaining activities 𝐸 + 1 to 100, for a total of 𝐸 + 50 − 𝐸 = 50 activities). 
After this initial activity split, we assume that the company will adapt with the goal of enhancing 
performance. To capture adaptation, we assume that boundedly rational decision makers in each period 
take one activity at random and experiment with relocating it to the other unit. This experimentation 
process is based on making incremental changes to a benchmark that we call the “latest performance-
enhancing configuration.” Those changes are kept whenever they improve performance and discarded 
when they do not. The latest performance-enhancing configuration is the most recent configuration that 
resulted in improved performance (or the initial activity split if no improvements have been found so far). 
Therefore, in each round, the firm takes the latest performance-enhancing configuration, randomly 
chooses one activity between 𝐸 + 1 and 100, moves it to the opposing unit, and observes performance. If 
the change results in performance that is better than the performance exhibited by the most recent 
performance-enhancing configuration, the new configuration is stored as the “new” latest performance-
enhancing configuration (overriding the old one). Future changes are then based on this benchmark. If the 
change results in poorer performance, it is abandoned, and future changes are made to the “old” latest 
performance-enhancing configuration, which may lie several rounds in the past, especially when it is 
close to the optimal solution. Importantly, in this learning process, we assume that it is only possible to 
observe aggregate performance changes as opposed to individual components of performance. Hence, the 
decision maker cannot know how much of the impact on performance can be attributed to changes in the 
underlying fit with the landscape, or the extent to which the impact is the result of round-to-round 
fluctuations in the noise parameter. The decision maker therefore keeps any change that increases the sum 
of the two.  
***Figure 2 about here*** 
Performance of the two strategies. As depicted in Figure 2, each of the two knowledge-accumulation 
strategies has a distinct performance profile. A firm adopting the host-based strategy does not experiment 
with different organizational configurations prior to offshoring. Similar to Nokia, it adapts on a learning-
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by-doing approach in which it attempts to identify the best configuration for its activities after the 
offshoring occurs. As a consequence, the firm does not accumulate any architectural knowledge of the 
dispersed set-up prior to the actual offshoring (here, 𝑇 = 200 and 𝐻 = 500). Performance is therefore 
held constant up to the point of implementation. However, when the firm commences offshoring at time 
T, it begins experimenting with different configurations with the purpose of enhancing performance. 
Given the added distance between the domestic and foreign activities, the costs of reconfiguration and 
coordination are significantly higher than they were prior to offshoring.  
In contrast, in the home-based strategy, the firm experiments with the configuration of activities 
while all activities are still co-located domestically. The purposes of the experimentation are to gain 
architectural knowledge and to understand the performance effects of different configurations. As Figure 
2 shows, a firm that pursues a home-based strategy finds that the costs of accumulating architectural 
knowledge negatively affect performance immediately prior to offshoring. However, as the firm 
accumulates knowledge about how to best configure itself prior to offshoring, its performance improves. 
Moreover, as the firm has utilized the period prior to offshoring to identify a configuration that reduces 
coordination costs, the coordination cost increase associated with actually relocating activities abroad at 
time T are relatively low. Therefore, the firm’s relocation of activities abroad has few major, disruptive 
implications for performance. The fact that the firm gains architectural knowledge while the activities are 
still co-located subsequently reduces the coordination costs associated with offshoring. 
As is evident in Figure 2, the differences in performance between the two approaches create a 
potential dilemma. When the additional coordination costs associated with unprepared offshoring (the 
area between the two curves furthest to the right) are higher than the costs of accumulating architectural 
knowledge prior to offshoring (the area between the two curves furthest to the left), the home-based 
approach results in higher accumulated performance than the host-based approach. Conversely, when the 
opposite is the case, the host-based strategy results in higher accumulated performance. Thus, to explore 
this tension and derive the implications of adaptation in offshoring, we run our simulation model for a 
variety of parameter-value combinations. 
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Contingencies for offshoring: a simulation of the two learning strategies 
Parameter Configuration. To set the numerical values of the parameters for the simulation, we rely on a 
combination of (1) a detailed analysis of the economic logic of the model, (2) quantitative data relating to 
the variables in our model, (3) conversations with managers from multinational firms, and (4) prior 
studies in the offshoring and simulation literatures. Furthermore, we subsequently provide a number of 
robustness tests where we deviate from our baseline parameter choices in order to test the impact of our 
choices on the results of the model. 
First, it is important that our parameters are internally consistent with each other and with the 
empirical phenomenon that the model aims to explain. Our study is motivated by the observation that 
firms struggle to reap performance benefits from offshoring, and that a key reason for this is the apparent 
cost savings being hollowed out by increases in coordination costs when activities become geographically 
dispersed. This tension implies that a relevant model of offshoring should be calibrated so that there is 
balance between production cost savings and international coordination costs, implying parameter choices 
that fulfill Inequality [3] developed above. The alternative is to assume that centripetal and centrifugal 
forces are ‘unbalanced’, with international coordination costs that are either prohibitively high (in which 
case firms would never find it attractive to offshore in the first place) or trivially low (in which case firms 
would easily redeploy entire value chains to foreign countries) compared to cost savings. Arguably, both 
of these scenarios are at odds with real-world observation (e.g. Ferreira and Prokopets 2009, Larsen et al. 
2013).  
We can also see from Inequality [3] that the range in which these forces are balanced is 
determined by the number of home country embedded activities (E) and the degree of natural modularity 
in the technological landscape (x). In fact, a condition for this range to exist is that both of these 
parameters are sufficiently high, as defined by 𝑥 > (100 − 𝐸)/(100 + 𝐸). Intuitively, when the 
technological landscape is highly modular (and the entire value chain is not footloose) it is particularly 
useful for the offshoring firm to acquire architectural knowledge so that it can selectively relocate 
activities along these modular boundaries. For example, Nokia decided to only relocate a subset of their 
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product development processes, reflecting the more general tendency of firms to offshore carefully 
delimited parts of their value chains (Contractor et al. 2010). Different combinations of x and R could 
fulfill this constraint, but we choose in our main analysis to keep home country embeddedness relatively 
low (𝐸 = 10) and landscape modularity correspondingly high (𝑥 = 0.9) in order to give the firm 
significant room for experimentation and architectural knowledge accumulation. With these values, the 
condition for centrifugal and centripetal forces to be balanced reduces to !# < (𝑘#%(1 + 𝐷))/(𝑃! − 𝑃") <
"
$.  
 Based on statistics on wage differences across developed and emerging markets, we set the 
production cost savings at 70% (by setting 𝑃! = 1 and 𝑃" = 0.3) in our main run of the simulation.7 This 
choice, in turn, implies a parameter range for the international coordination costs where 0.10 < 𝑘#%(1 +
𝐷) < 0.28. Again, many different combinations of 𝑘#% and D could fulfill this constraint. However, our 
conversations with executives from the telecommunications sector have indicated that coordination costs 
might be roughly 3 to 4 times as high after offshoring as they are before, depending on the distance.8 The 
sources of these additional costs include the increased time that individuals spend on coordination 
activities, the need to create dedicated liaison positions that specialize in coordination across functions 
and borders, the costs of business travel relating to coordination meetings, and a need for socialization by 
rotating people across borders to understand local context and share tacit knowledge. These mechanisms 
are to a large extent driven by the loss of face-to-face interaction resulting from geographic separation of 
activities (Storper and Venables 2004). 
 Hence, to capture a tripling or quadrupling of coordination costs, we set 𝐷 = (2, 3) in our model, 
and combine those values with 𝑘#% = (0.04, 0.06) in order to arrive at a reasonable range for 𝑘#%(1 +
𝐷), which then varies from 0.12 to 0.24. This is well within the required range for international 
 
7 The wage statistics are found in “Prices and Earnings”, CIO Wealth Management Research, UBS, September 
2012. We took the average ratio of engineering wages in selected emerging market cities (Rio de Janeiro, Taipei, 
Sao Paolo, Tallinn, Budapest, Bratislava, Prague, Shanghai, Mumbai) to engineering wages in selected developed 
market cities (Copenhagen, Munich, Tokyo, and Chicago) and rounded it up to 0.3. 
8 A summary of an interview with a TelCo executive, and calculations of different coordination cost scenarios based 
on this interview, is available from the authors upon request. 
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coordination costs calculated above (0.10 to 0.28) while still giving us enough variation in these costs to 
assess the importance of the underlying parameters. The average (𝑘#% = 0.18) results in the selective 
offshoring strategy incurring expected international coordination costs of 1,250(1 − 𝑥)𝑘#%(1 + 𝐷) =
22!", which is about 64% of the expected production costs savings of 35. This is consistent with estimates 
from offshoring consultants implying that slightly more than half of the wage cost savings are often offset 
by the ‘soft costs’ of offshoring (neoIT, 2004). 
 In addition to these choices, we also need specific values for noise, timing, and revenue in order 
to run the simulation. As noted by Levinthal (1997, p. 947), “it is appropriate to calibrate [the noise 
parameter] 𝜖 relative to the magnitude of the distribution of actual fitness values.” We adopt this principle 
in our simulation to avoid the risk of setting noise levels that are out of proportion to the underlying 
fitness levels. Arguably, the appropriate calibration benchmark in the context of our specific model is the 
coordination cost change that provides feedback in the learning process, since our noise parameter is 
conceptualized as a disturbance that interferes strongly or weakly with the acquisition of architectural 
knowledge. To see the impact of noise clearly, we therefore suggest that ‘low’ noise should mostly enable 
learning even while allowing for occasional mistakes, whereas ‘high’ noise should reduce learning about 
the landscape to a minimum, but without eliminating it altogether. We operationalize this as having a 95% 
probability of keeping a good decision when noise is low and 55% when it is high9. It can be shown that 
probabilities of this magnitude are achieved in the first round of the simulation when setting low noise to 
𝜎 = 0.15 and high noise to 𝜎 = 2 (underlying calculations can be found in Online Appendix 3).  
 We set the horizon of the model to 𝐻 = 500 and the time of the offshoring event to 𝑇 = 200, as 
these choices seem to give sufficient time to exploit (without fully exhausting) learning opportunities both 
before and after offshoring. Finally, we set 𝑅 = 1,000. This is without loss of generality since, being 
 
9 50% is a natural lower limit for this probability, since that implies that the decision maker does not see any 
difference between the good or bad changes and therefore applies the same stochastic decision rule to them. 
Probabilities below 50% would imply that the decision maker is biased against good changes, which defies both 
common sense and the logic of our model. 
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constant across the two strategies, the revenue disappears when we difference them and thus has no effect 
on our conclusions.  
RESULTS 
The results of our simulation are reported in Table 1. Since the technological landscape is randomly 
drawn, the reported results are averaged over 100 landscapes to smooth out the stochastic component in 
any single landscape (for similar procedures, see e.g. Ethiraj and Levinthal, 2004a, 2004b, Ethiraj et al. 
2008). To derive each cell in the table, we set the specified values of 𝑘#%, 𝜎, and D for that cell. Based on 
those parameter values, we run 50 simulations of the host-based strategy and 50 simulations of the home-
based strategy on each of the 100 landscapes, for a total of 5,000 simulations of each strategy for each 
cell. To determine the relative attractiveness of the two strategies, we compare the total accumulated 
performance of each strategy over the 500 time periods (∑ 𝜋'())'*+ ). We average the cumulative 
performance of each strategy over those 5,000 simulations and subtract the cumulative performance of the 
home-based strategy from that of the host-based strategy. The resulting number is reported in the relevant 
cell, with a positive number indicating that the host-based strategy yields higher performance than the 
home-based strategy and a negative number indicating the opposite.  
***Table 1 about here*** 
 In Table 2, we treat each landscape of our simulation as a random sampling from a “population” 
of landscapes and apply statistical techniques to the averages of those 100 landscapes. This enables us to 
assess whether the effects of the different parameters are significant, as opposed to being merely caused 
by fluctuations from landscape to landscape. Specifically we take the differences between the averages in 
Table 1 for different parameter values and using the t-test to assess whether those differences are high 
enough to warrant a firm conclusion given the underlying standard deviation. In the following, we discuss 
the implications of this table for the comparative statics of noise, distance, and coordination costs, and use 
these to develop a number of theoretical propositions. 
***Table 2 about here *** 
The effect of noise  
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Our results strongly indicate that high noise in the performance function (measured by its standard 
deviation s) makes the host-based learning strategy relatively more attractive. As mentioned above, we 
can see that each high-noise column in Table 1 features larger values than the corresponding low-noise 
column. In Table 2, this translates into positive numbers (indicating a positive effect on the relative 
attractiveness of the host-based learning strategy) for noise under all four combinations of the other 
parameters.  Therefore, in situations with high levels of noise, our model suggests that firms benefit from 
choosing a host-based learning strategy in which successful adaptation is the result of learning-by-doing 
over longer periods of time. This effect is formalized as follows: 
Proposition 1: Noise has a positive effect on the relative attractiveness of the host-based strategy. 
To get a clearer indication of the mechanism underlying Proposition 1, it is useful to take a 
detailed look at how noise influences the performance profiles of the two strategies. As illustrated in the 
left panel of Figure 3, in the absence of noise, a firm pursuing a home-based strategy for offshoring 
incrementally learns and accumulates knowledge about how to configure the organization to enhance 
performance. In this example, this learning strategy is valuable because the distance to the host country is 
relatively large, and because a firm that decides to follow a host-based strategy of offshoring without first 
trying to learn about the natural modules in the technological landscape will suffer very high costs of 
coordination immediately after offshoring. As a consequence, as the left panel of Figure 3 shows, the 
home-based strategy is clearly better—the benefit of home-based learning (the area between the curves 
after offshoring) is greater than the costs of such learning (the area between the curves before offshoring). 
*** Figure 3 about here *** 
However, as demonstrated in the right panel, this conclusion may change as soon as we 
incorporate noise into the model. As that panel indicates, given a high degree of noise in the performance 
function, the learning that would otherwise take place in the home-based strategy is less likely to occur. 
Therefore, the firm’s performance does not improve as much prior to offshoring despite the proactive 
search for new configurations that will yield higher performance. As noise creates uncertainty that 
overwhelms the relative low coordination costs at home, the decision maker cannot properly evaluate the 
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effects of organizational decisions prior to offshoring. In such situations, decision makers may find that 
organizational configurations and preparation measures taken prior to offshoring in a home-based 
strategy may prove inadequate, and that they need to unlearn the knowledge accumulated at home while 
accommodating the higher coordination costs of operating in the offshoring locations. As the firm 
commences offshoring (t = 200), therefore, it will experience a decline in performance that is almost as 
large as the decline experienced by the host-based learning firm. This means that when the noise level is 
high, the costs of home-based learning are higher and the benefits are lower, which in turn means that the 
host-based strategy offers better performance. Essentially, it is not worthwhile to prepare for an event if 
the causality of that event can only be understood through actual experiential learning. 
The effect of distance 
The negative values for distance in Table 2 indicate that, in general, distance favors the home-based 
strategy. This is also visible in Table 1 where the high-distance row consistently contains lower numbers 
than the low-distance row does. Intuitively, high distance leads to a high performance penalty for the 
host-based learning strategy, which results in high coordination costs immediately after offshoring. In 
contrast, a firm adopting a home-based learning strategy has learned about the landscape in advance and, 
therefore, does not suffer these high coordination costs. Hence, when a firm decides to offshore activities 
to a location where the impact of distance on coordination costs is high, a home-based strategy may yield 
higher accumulated performance than a host-based strategy. Conversely, the host-based learning strategy 
may in fact be better when the offshoring location is more proximate, as seen by the positive numbers in 
the low-distance row in Table 1.  
 However, there is an important caveat to this conclusion: the effect of distance is not equally 
strong across different levels of noise. In fact, distance becomes much less important when noise is high, 
as indicated by the relatively weak effects and low t-values in the third and fourth row in Table 2, and in 
one case the effect even disappears (as the t-value becomes insignificant). As the positive effect of 
distance on the relative attractiveness of the home-based strategy is contingent on successful home-based 
learning, high noise reduces this effect. In other words, when noise is high, distance has an almost equally 
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strong negative effect on the home-based and the host-based strategies, whereas distance has a much 
stronger negative effect on the host-based strategy when noise is low. This is clear in Table 2, where both 
interaction terms are significant (their positive sign is due to the host-based strategy being the benchmark 
in the table). On this basis, we derive our second proposition: 
Proposition 2: Noise negatively moderates the positive effect of distance on the relative 
attractiveness of the home-based strategy, such that this effect becomes weak and may disappear 
at high levels of noise. 
 
The effect of coordination costs 
Finally, the magnitude of coordination costs also has implications for the relative attractiveness of the two 
strategies. However, the implications are even more ambiguous than for the other two parameters: high 
coordination costs sometimes favor the host-based strategy (especially when noise is high), while at other 
times it has no effect or even favors the home-based strategy (when noise is low). This surprising finding 
can be explained intuitively by looking at the way in which noise influences the effectiveness of home-
based learning. We know that with high levels of noise, the home-based strategy does not produce much 
learning prior to offshoring. Therefore, the firm does not reap much of a post-offshoring benefit compared 
to the host-based strategy. In this case, higher marginal coordination costs merely lead to the home-based 
strategy incurring higher initial coordination costs without the associated benefits, which speaks in favor 
of the host-based strategy.  
 With low noise, we know that home-based learning can be effective. In that case, there are two 
effects of increased marginal coordination costs: an increase in the costs of home-based learning before 
offshoring (favoring the host-based strategy), and an increase in the benefit of learning after offshoring 
(favoring the home-based strategy). The latter could conceivably dominate the former. In that scenario, an 
increase in coordination costs is particularly costly for the host-based strategy, which experiences the full 
coordination costs, inflated by distance, after offshoring. For example, successful coordination in a firm 
may depend on costly face-to-face coordination (in contrast to formalized coordination mechanisms, such 
as standardization and centralization), such that employees need to be physically co-located to ensure 
effective joint work (e.g., research and development). This may be the case in industries that rely on tacit 
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and complex knowledge—types of knowledge that are difficult and costly to communicate. In these cases, 
our model suggests that it is beneficial to search for an organizational configuration while the activities 
are still co-located so that activities requiring costly coordination are placed in one country rather than 
across countries. The idea that noise moderates the effect of coordination costs, which is supported by the 
significant t-values in Table 2, is captured by our final proposition: 
Proposition 3: Noise positively moderates the effect of coordination costs on the relative 
attractiveness of the host-based strategy, which may then be negative at low levels of noise and 
positive at high levels of noise. 
 
Robustness  
In addition to the parameter configurations described above, we also performed a number of robustness 
tests to see to what extent the results were sensitive to changes in the other assumptions of the model. 
First, we examined the impact of changing the timing of the model. Hence, holding the underlying 
technological landscape constant, we set 𝑇 = 200 (as above),  𝑇 = 150 (early offshoring), and 𝑇 = 250 
(late offshoring), respectively, running 50 simulations of both strategies in each case. We then looked at 
how the parameter effects (as reported in Table 2) changed as a consequence of this variation. The 
conclusion was that the effects were virtually unchanged, with correlations between the effect size vectors 
for different values of T being in the 0.94-0.96 range. We repeated this procedure for the time horizon, 
setting 𝐻 = (450, 500, 550), with identical conclusions (correlations also in the 0.94-0.96 range). 
Furthermore, since we held production cost savings constant in our main parameterization of the model, 
we tested the sensitivity of the results to these costs in a similar manner and with similar results, setting 
𝑃" = (0.22, 0.30, 0.38) and obtaining correlations in the 0.94-0.98 range. 
Finally, a different take on the robustness of our results is to assess the statistical properties 
associated with the number of landscapes (100) we have drawn in the simulation. While more landscapes 
would always be better, and provide an even stronger indication that our results are not artefacts of the 
randomly drawn landscapes, we can at least assess the statistical confidence and power associated with 
100 draws. First, as to confidence, we can see from Table 2 that all of our propositions are based on 
coefficients that are significant at p<0.0001, suggesting that 100 draws in our case is more than sufficient 
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to reduce the risk of type 2 error to a generally accepted level. Second, power is less of a problem since 
there is only one effect in Table 2 which is insignificant (the effect of distance under high noise and high 
uncertainty). It has an effect size (mean divided by standard deviation) of 0.07, and to detect such a low 
effect size with, for example, 99% confidence and 80% power, would require a sample size of 2,048 
landscapes. Hence, while we cannot rule out that there we have made a type 1 error in rejecting this 
effect, it is worth noting the (more than 20-fold) increase in the number of landscapes that would be 
required to detect such a small effect, and also the fact that this effect is in any case about 1% of the effect 
sizes underlying proposition 1 (noise).  
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
In this article, we have a developed and explored a formal model of local adaptive search in the context of 
relocating organizational activities to foreign locations (i.e. offshoring). Our results are two-fold. First, we 
portray the process of organizational adaptation in the context of offshoring. We do so by juxtaposing two 
knowledge-accumulation strategies: a home-based learning strategy in which the firm starts to 
experiment and search for a configuration prior to offshoring while the activities are still co-located at 
home; and a host-based learning strategy in which the firm starts to search for a configuration using its 
experiences with the actual offshoring. We show that a firm pursuing a home-based strategy experiences 
comparatively poorer performance while the activities are still co-located, and that performance improves 
as the firm identifies configurations that reduce coordination costs. Conversely, a firm pursuing the host-
based strategy experiences a significant decline in performance following the offshoring implementation, 
as coordination costs rise due to the spatial separation, after which it experiments with different 
configurations in order to improve performance.  
 Second, we demonstrate how the general adaptation patterns are largely dependent on the levels 
of geographic distance, noise, and coordination costs When firms aim to offshore to geographically 
distant locations, pursuing a home-based learning strategy becomes relatively more attractive, because it 
reduces the risk of being overwhelmed by coordination costs after the offshoring implementation. Hence, 
a combination of high coordination costs and high distance to an offshoring destination is a particularly 
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deadly combination for firms that have not done careful and elaborate preparation before offshoring. 
More interesting, however, we also find that when the level of noise in firms’ performance function is 
high, the host-based learning strategy becomes relatively more attractive irrespective of the level of the 
other contingencies. As noise generates uncertainty, the ability to evaluate the appropriateness of the 
architectural knowledge is undermined and the likelihood of making inefficient design decisions 
increases. Noise lowers the benefits of learning at home and leaves the firm more vulnerable to higher 
coordination costs when it goes abroad.  Thus, in situations with high levels of uncertainty, firms benefit 
from pursuing host-based learning strategies despite vast distances and costly coordination requirements. 
Noise increases the risk of judgment error (Lampel and Shapira 2001) or due-diligence failure (Puranam 
et al. 2006) to the point that the firm would benefit more from relying on actual experience or learning-
by-doing. In that sense, Nokia Denmark’s host-based approach to the offshoring of complex product-
development activities may have been a sound one, even though it led to unexpected costs and problems 
that required corrective action. Given the noise that arguably exists in the highly volatile mobile-phone 
industry, it may have been very difficult for Nokia Denmark to accumulate the necessary architectural 
knowledge through a home-based strategy. Moreover, an attempt to do so might have created a risk of 
accumulating the wrong knowledge about the underlying technological landscape, which may have led to 
a need to unlearn knowledge as the organization embarked on offshoring.  
With this study, we contribute to research on offshoring and the global distribution of work 
(Contractor et al. 2010, Jensen et al. 2013, Srikanth and Puranam  2011). In our formal modeling of how 
firms adapt to underlying international technological landscapes, we have investigated two distinct 
offshoring strategies that yield different performance implications given central contingencies—marginal 
coordination costs, the impact of distance on the coordination of international activities, and the role of 
noise in the performance function. Arguably, adaption in an international context includes both a spatial 
and an organizational dimension, where the former involves adaption to the differences manifested in the 
host locations and the latter relates to making the value chain work in a new setting (Szulanski and Jensen 
2008). However, while most international business research has focused on how firms adapt along the 
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spatial dimension (e.g., Lord and Ranft 2000, Makino and Delios 1996, Siegel and Larson 2009), this 
study stresses the performance implications of the ways in which firms gain architectural knowledge 
when going abroad. In particular, we argue that the added distance between organizational activities 
increases firms’ coordination costs and that they must search for new configurations that fit the 
international dispersion in order to optimize performance. As such, firms must accumulate both local-
market knowledge and architectural knowledge (Baldwin and Clark 2000, Brusoni and Prencipe 2006, 
Ethiraj and Levinthal 2004a, Henderson and Clark 1990). In fact, one of the advantages of our model is 
that we conceptualize and formalize architectural knowledge as distinct from local market knowledge, in 
contrast to most studies on international expansion, which lump these two types of knowledge together. 
Future research could, therefore, carefully investigate how distance affects the interdependencies among 
organizational units when reconfiguring and how those interdependencies eventually affect performance 
(see also Kumar et al. 2009, Srikanth and Puranam 2011). Relatedly, future research could empirically 
investigate how decision makers accumulate architectural knowledge in the process of offshoring.
 Moreover, our study suggests that the accumulation of architectural knowledge (Ethiraj and 
Levinthal 2004a, Henderson and Clark 1990) presents firms with a strategy that is useful to balance the 
tradeoffs among strategic rationales—such as lower production costs in foreign locations with the costs of 
coordination and distance. However, our results suggest that the noise surrounding such decisions is 
particularly detrimental in shaping effective adaptation processes. Accordingly, we argue that noise can 
lead to situations of causal ambiguity in which firms cannot determine the causes of their performance 
(Lippman and Rumelt 1982, Powell et al. 2006). In such situations, firms and their decision makers are 
unable either ex ante or ex post to produce an unambiguous explanation of how the key components of a 
system work and interact (Denrell and March 2001, King and Zeithaml 2001). While it has been argued 
that firms must rely on additional heuristics to guide effective adaptation in noisy situations (Lounamaa 
and March 1987, Denrell and March 2001), we find that noise, in general, undermines firms’ abilities to 
accumulate the architectural knowledge necessary for adaptation. Therefore, efforts to learn prior to 
implementation may be counterproductive or based on incorrect premises.  
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Rather, firms that are able to recognize noisy situations will experience more accurate search and 
better outcomes. Instead of being stuck on a suboptimal peak as a result of an imprecise home-based 
search strategy, firms that acknowledge the need for more accurate performance signals would sustain a 
comparative advantage. In our context, such performance signals would be more easily attained through a 
host-based search strategy. Accordingly, we suggest that it is important to consider the ability of firms to 
identify noisy situations and thus the need to explore more distant search options when planning on how 
to most efficiently accumulate architectural knowledge (see also Knudsen and Levinthal 2007, Gavetti 
and Levinthal 2000). Importantly, we hold that future research should pay much closer attention to the 
concept, antecedents, and consequences of noisy search in processes of international expansion and 
learning. For example, under what contingencies are search processes likely to be noisier? How can noise 
be captured empirically? Is noisy search unavoidable? Can some firms better foresee and cope with the 
challenges of noise? Undoubtedly, unraveling the answers to such questions would be of vast importance 
in advancing our understanding of firms’ adaptation processes. Hence, while noise is an exogenous 
parameter in our model, a possible extension could be to endogenize it, for example modeling it as a 
function of industry or market characteristics or of the actions and strategies pursued by the firm. Also, as 
opposed to our (technology-driven) noise function, other types of noise could be explored, such as those 
stemming from the value chain activities’ geographic footprint or their distribution across firm boundaries 
(e.g. outsourcing) (see e.g. Levy 1995). 
Taken together, our results shed light on the conventional wisdom on the initiation of learning 
processes in offshoring (e.g., Massini et al. 2010), and on the value of strategic planning and due 
diligence in general (Ansoff et al. 1970, Puranam et al. 2006). We demonstrate that the firms’ strategies 
are subject to learning, and that learning depends on the signal-to-noise ratio. Thus, rather than 
confirming the proposition that firms that prepare upfront by implementing predefined, corporate-wide 
offshoring strategies are more likely to generate higher offshoring performance, our results suggest that 
firms may benefit from pursuing a learning-by-doing strategy in some cases, especially when the noise 
levels inherent in the technological landscape are high. With higher noise, the performance signals are 
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weak, making it difficult for firms to accumulate proper architectural knowledge through a home-based 
strategy. In this situation, a firm might run the risk of accumulating the wrong knowledge about the 
underlying technological landscape, which would result in a need to unlearn knowledge as it embarks on 
offshoring. While we examined this paradox in a simulation study of offshoring, future research could 
investigate other organizational and environmental contingencies that may be equally relevant for firms 
attempting to address this paradox. For example, although our model is designed with the primary 
purpose of understanding adaptation in offshoring, its underlying logic of architectural knowledge 
accumulation given organizational reconfigurations is applicable to other contexts, such as diversification 
(Rawley 2010), unit reconfigurations (Karim and Williams 2012), and, as mentioned above, outsourcing 
(Williamson 2008). As to the latter, our arguments are general enough to apply to all scenarios in which 
coordination costs are inflated by distance, and such scenarios would arguably also include outsourcing, 
given that coordination with third parties located in distant countries is more difficult than coordination 
with domestic outsourcing partners. Nevertheless, an extension of our model could be to model both 
offshoring and outsourcing choices explicitly, as the two dimensions could have potentially compounding 
implications for coordination and production costs. 
 Our findings are largely in line with the work of Szulanski and Jensen (2006, 2008), who also 
focus on the role of architectural knowledge accumulation. Their studies on franchising projects focus on 
the temporal aspects of adaptation after going international. They find that, initially, architectural 
knowledge is key, while local market adaptation only becomes important at a later point. We go beyond 
such studies by including the pre-offshoring phase and the possibility of a home-based learning strategy 
aimed at predicting the configurations that might work after offshoring. Similar to Szulanski and Jensen 
(2006, 2008), we find that home-based learning cannot serve as a substitute for experiential learning after 
offshoring in some cases.  
In this respect, however, it should be mentioned that we have examined two rather stylized 
strategies of offshoring—i.e., home- and host-based learning. Naturally, other firms may opt for other 
strategies. For example, a firm may decide to have an entire team spend some months together doing pilot 
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tests of reconfiguration either at home or at the host location. Pursuing this strategy would enable the 
teams to establish mechanism of tacit coordination, being defined as “mechanisms that enable the 
formation and leverage of common ground without the need for direct, ongoing communication” 
(Srikanth and Puranam 2011, p. 850). Thus, by establishing common knowledge and shared focal points 
through socialization efforts teams can create a basis of shared knowledge that enables interacting agents 
to accurately adjust and align their actions to each other—in other words, to coordinate successfully. 
Thus, going forward, we encourage future research to investigate the costs and benefits of such strategies 
in processes of adaptation when offshoring. 
Finally, we contribute to research that embraces formal methods to investigate firm adaptation by 
acknowledging that distance, noise, and different strategies for accumulating architectural knowledge 
affect firm performance. While some models have focused on noise or uncertainty in an attempt to 
understand adaptive search (e.g., Denrell and March 2001, Levinthal 1997, Knudsen and Levinthal 2007, 
Sommer and Loch 2004), the impact of geography and distance has largely been neglected. In our model, 
we show how noise and the distance between organizational units magnify coordination costs and, 
consequently, complicate the process of adaptation. As such, we demonstrate how distance shapes the 
structure of firms’ underlying performance landscapes. Moreover, our model is unique in terms of its 
simulation of local search strategies given the implementation of a strategic initiative (i.e., the inclusion of 
foreign operations). This approach has allowed us to investigate a central question regarding the effects 
and value of different learning strategies. Indeed, opposing search strategies, such as cognition versus 
experiential search (Gavetti and Levinthal 2000), search versus stability (Rivkin and Siggelkow 2003), 
and integrated versus chunky search (Baumann and Siggelkow 2014), are emphasized in the modelling 
literature. However, by including an exogenous shock to the model, we have been able to isolate and 
compare the opposing learning effects in the context of strategy implementation. Future research on 
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Figure 1: Nokia product development 
 
Figure 2: Performance profiles of the two strategies 
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Table 1: Relative attractiveness of the host-based strategy 
 Low coordination cost (𝑘#% = 0.04) High coordination cost (𝑘#% = 0.06) 
 Low noise  
(𝜎 = 0.15) 
High noise 
(𝜎 = 2) 
Low noise 
 (𝜎 = 0.15) 
High noise  
(𝜎 = 2) 
High distance  
(𝐷 = 3) 
-9,476 8,246 -15,647 11,192 
Low distance   
(𝐷 = 2)  
-4,687 9,183 -9,414 11,489 
 
Table 2: Effect of parameters on relative attractiveness of the host-based strategy 
Effect of Contingencies Avg. SD N T 
Noise Low distance, low c. cost 13,870 1,475 100 93.9** 
Noise Low distance, high c. cost 20,903 3,034 100 68.9** 
Noise High distance, low c. cost 17,722 2,124 100 83.5** 
Noise High distance, high c. cost 26,839 3,344 100             80.3** 
Distance Low noise, low c. cost -4,789 919 100 -52.1** 
Distance Low noise, high c. cost -6,233 1,566 100 -39.8** 
Distance High noise, low c. cost -937 2,485 100            -3.8**  
Distance High noise, high c. cost -296 4,044 100            -0.7 
C. cost Low distance, low noise -4,727 1,038 100          -45.5** 
C. cost Low distance, high noise 2,306 3,237 100 7.1** 
C. cost High distance, low noise -6,171 1,493 100 -41.3** 
C. cost High distance, high noise 2,946 3,361 100 8.8** 
Noise * distance Low c. cost 3,852 2,639 100 14.6** 
Noise * distance High c. cost 5,937 4,495 100 13.2** 
Noise * c. cost Low distance 7,033 3,521 100 20.0** 
Noise * c. cost High distance 9,117 3,753 100 24.4** 
“c. cost” = coordination cost, * p<0.001, ** p<0.0001. 
 
 
 
